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1 Introduction
The interest in the economic analysis of advertising is continuously resuscitated by the amazing
diversity of media1 and by the large amounts invested in advertising. The US 100 largest
advertisers spent a total of USD 90.31 billion on advertising in 2003, with amounts ranging
between USD 0.317-3.43 billions.2 The most advertised segments include many consumer goods:
Beer, cigarettes, cleaners, food products, personal care, and soft drinks. In many of these markets
the goods are nearly homogenous, and the high amounts mentioned above seem to suggest that
advertising, rather than increasing the demand, redistributes the buyers among sellers.
In the present paper, I study the strategic eﬀect of persuasive advertising in homogenous
product markets. For this purpose, I construct a model of two-dimensional competition in
non-price advertising and prices. Firms first invest in advertising in order to induce brand
loyalty to consumers who would otherwise purchase the cheapest alternative on the market,
and then compete in prices for the remaining brand indiﬀerent consumers. At equilibrium,
prices exhibit dispersion being random draws from asymmetric distributions. The variation in
the price distributions is reflected by the expected profits and, in consequence, the advertising
levels chosen by the firms are asymmetric. There is one firm choosing a lower advertising level,
while the remaining firms choose the same higher advertising. For this profile of advertising
expenditure, there are a family of pricing equilibria with at least two firms randomizing on
prices. One limiting equilibrium has all firms randomizing; the other one has only two firms
randomizing and the others choosing monopoly pricing with probability 1. As the number of
rivals increases, more firms prefer to price less aggressively, counting on their loyal bases rather
than undercutting in order to capture the indiﬀerent market. Firms compensate a larger first
stage advertising investment by means of less aggressive pricing, and a lower advertising by more
aggressive second stage prices. Asymmetry follows from the fact that firms are counterbalacing
their advertising and pricing decisions.
The setting proposes a way of modelling homogenous product markets where persuasive ad-
vertising creates subjective product diﬀerentiation and changes the nature of subsequent price
competition. It also oﬀers a new perspective on the coexistence of advertising and price dis-
persion. The market outcome turns out to be asymmetric, despite a priori symmetry of the
firms.
1Magazines, newspapers, television, radio, internet or outdoor ads.
2Advertising Age, June 28, 2004, 100 Leading National Advertisers.
2
The model predicts an asymmetric advertising expenditure profile more adequate for small
oligopolies. The results relate to the carbonated cola drinks market in the US, where Coca Cola
and Pepsico invest similar large amounts in advertising, while Cadbury-Schweppes has lower
advertising expenditure. Similarly, in the US sport drinks market, Pepsico highly advertises its
product Gatorade, while Coca Cola promotes less its product Powerade.
The basic model in this paper draws from the persuasive view on advertising that goes back
to Kaldor (1950).3 More recently, Friedman (1983) and Schmalensee (1972,1976) dealt with
oligopoly competition in models where advertising increases selective demand.4 Schmalensee
(1972) explores the role played by promotional competition in diﬀerentiated oligopoly markets
where price changes are infrequent. This article departs from his work assuming that competition
takes place in both advertising and prices. It turns out that advertising can significantly relax
price competition.
Much empirical work explored whether homogenous goods advertising is informative and
aﬀects the primary (industry) demand, or is persuasive and aﬀects only the selective (brand)
demand. The results are often contradictory, and they seem to vary across industries. The
persuasive view was supported by Baltagi and Levin (1986) in the US cigarette industry, and
by Kelton and Kelton (1982) for US brewery industry. Using inter-industry data, they report
a strong eﬀect of advertising on selective demand.5 More recent studies, using disaggregated
data (at industry or brand level), show that advertising is meant to decrease consumers’ price
sensitivity. For instance, Krishnamurthi and Raj (1985) find that brand demand becomes more
inelastic once advertising increases.6
Using a model where advertising creates vertical diﬀerentiation, Sutton (1991) points out
to the existence of two-tier markets as a result of diﬀerences in consumer tastes.7 In his
3Robinson (1933), Braithwaite (1928), Galbraith (1958, 1967) and Packard (1957,1969) also contributed to
this view.
4Von der Fehr and Stevik (1998) and Bloch and Manceau (1999) analyze the role of persuasive advertising
in diﬀerentiated duopoly markets, and Tremblay and Polasky (2002) show how persuasive advertising may aﬀect
price competition in a duopoly with no real product diﬀerentiation.
5Lee and Tremblay (1992) find no evidence that advertising promotes beer consumption in the US. Nelson and
Moran (1995), in an inter-industry study of alcoholic beverages, conclude that advertising serves to reallocate
brand sales.
6Pedrick and Zufryden (1991) report a strong direct eﬀect of advertising exposure over brand choice in the
yogurt industry. However, some recent empirics point out towards the dominance of experience over advertising.
See Bagwell (2003) for a review.
7He focuses on the concentration-market size relationship in industries where firms incur endogeneous sunk
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study, frozen-food industry illustrates the emergence of dual structures (where high-advertisers
coexist with nonadvertisers) in advertising-intensive markets. As in Sutton’s model, here post
advertising consumers tastes are heterogenous.8 However in my model not all consumers rank
the advertised products the same (advertising induces subjective "horizontal" diﬀerentiation),
and the number of advertising-responsive consumers is endogenous. I show that a dual structure
emerges albeit the indiﬀerent consumer and the loyal markets are not independent.
Although it takes a diﬀerent view on advertising, my article shares a number of technical
features with part of the informative advertising literature dealing with price dispersion phe-
nomena. A seminal article by Stigler (1961) revealed the role of informative advertising in
homogenous product markets, and related it to price dispersion.9 ,10
The pricing stage of the game can be viewed as a modified version of the model of sales by
Varian (1980), in the sense that the total base of captured consumers is shared asymmetrically
instead of being evenly split among the firms. The two-stage game oﬀers a way of endogeneizing
consumers’ heterogeneity: It turns out that the symmetric outcome does not obtain, raising a
robustness question to Varian’s (1980) symmetric model.
Baye, Kovenock and de Vrier (1992) present an alternative way of checking the robustness
of Varian’s symmetric setting. They construct a metagame where both firms and consumers are
players, and asymmetric price distributions cannot form part of a subgame perfect equilibrium.
In my model, only firms are making decisions and the subgame perfect equilibria of the game
are asymmetric.
Narasimhan (1988) derived the mixed pricing equilibrium in a price-promotions model where
two brands act as monopolists on loyal consumer markets and compete in a common market
of brand switchers. The pricing stage of my model extends his setting to oligopoly, when the
switchers are extremely price sensitive.
Section 2 describes the model, while section 3 derives the equilibrium in the pricing stage
costs, and contrasts these results with those in markets with exogeneous setup costs.
8 In his setting, nonretail buyers do not respond to advertising, unlike retail customers.
9Butters (1977), Grossman and Shapiro (1984), McAfee (1994), Robert and Stahl (1993), Roy (2000) construct
price dispersion models where oligopolists use targeted advertising to oﬀer information about their products to
consumers who are completely uninformed or incur costly search to collect information.
10Recently, clearinghouse models have been used to explain persistent price dispersion in internet markets,
see Baye and Morgan (2001). The present setting can be linked to virtual markets: in the presence of price-
comparison sites, firms may have incentives to engage (prior to price competition) in costly search frustration
activities (obfuscation). See Ellison and Ellison (2001).
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and comments on the chosen strategies. Section 4 presents the equilibrium emerging in the
advertising stage, and defines the outcome of the sequential game. In section 5, I propose an
alternative interpretation of the model. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the setting and present some
concluding remarks. All the proofs missing from the text are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The Model
There are n firms selling a homogenous product. All firms have the same constant marginal cost.
In the first period, firms choose simultaneously and independently an advertising expenditure
and, in the second period, they compete in prices. Let αi be the advertising expenditure chosen
by firm i.
This model deals with non-price advertising. Each firm promotes its product to induce
subjective diﬀerentiation and generate brand loyalty.11 The fraction of consumers that are loyal
to firm i depends on the advertising expenditure profile. At the end of the first stage, the
advertising choices become common knowledge.
In the second stage, firm i chooses the set of prices that are assigned positive density in
equilibrium and the corresponding density function. Let Fi (p) be the cumulative distribution
function of firm i’s oﬀered prices. The price charged by a firm is a draw from its price distribution.
I assume that there is a continuum of consumers, with total measure 1, who desire to
purchase one unit of the good whenever its price does not exceed a common reservation value
r. After advertising takes place, part of the consumers remain indiﬀerent (possibly because no
advertising reached them or, alternatively, no advertising convinced them) and the remaining
ones become loyal to one brand or another. The indiﬀerent consumers view the alternatives
on the market as perfect substitutes and all purchase from the lowest price firm. The loyal
consumers are split amongst the advertised brands. The size of each group is determined by
the total advertising investment on the market. The total number of loyal consumers, U, is
assumed to be an increasing and concave function of the aggregate advertising expenditure of
the firms, U = U (Σiαi) , with limΣiαi→∞ U (Σiαi) = 1.12 Thus, with higher advertising more
11Advertising may carry some emotional content that potentially touches people and makes them develop
loyalty feelings for the product. Although there is no real diﬀerentiation among the products they elicit diﬀerent
associations due to advertising. See Section 6 for a more detailed discussion on this view.
12The empirical studies often present evidence that advertising is subject to diminishing returns to scale. See
the reviews by Scherer and Ross (1990) and Bagwell (2003).
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consumers join the captured (loyal) group. One may think that more advertising would be more
convincing. The captured consumers are split amongst the firms according to a market sharing
function depending on the advertising expenditure of the firms. Let it be S (αi, α−i) = Si ∈ [0, 1],
satisfying the following properties:13
1. Σi=1,...n Si = 1;
2.
∂Si
∂αi
≥ 0 with strict inequality if ∃j 6= i s.t. αj > 0 or if αj = 0, for all j;
3.
∂Si
∂αj
≤ 0 with strict inequality if αi > 0;
4. S (αi, 0) = 1 if αi > 0;
5. S (0, α−i) = 0 if ∃j 6= i s.t. αj > 0 and S (0, 0) = 0;
6. S (αi, α−i) is homogeneous of degree 0;
7. S (αi, α−i) = S (αi, eα−i) whenever eα−i is obtained from α−i by permutation.
The symmetry of the loyal market sharing function follows from the symmetry of the firms.
Conditions 1, 4 and 5 require that all loyal consumers be split amongst the firms with positive
advertising expenditure. Conditions 2 and 3 require that a higher own advertising increase the
market share of a firm, whenever it is below 1, and a higher rival advertising decrease the share
of a firm whenever it is above 0. Condition 6 requires that the share profile remain unchanged
to multiplications of the advertising by the same factor.14 Condition 7 states that the market
share of a firm is determined by the rivals’ advertising levels and not by their identity.
Finally, the remaining consumers form the base of indiﬀerent consumers, denominated by I.
Hence, each firm faces an indiﬀerent base I = 1−U (Σiαi) and a particular captured or locked-
in base Ui = S (αi, α−i)U (Σiαi) . Firms cannot price discriminate between these two types of
consumers.15
13This function is used by Schmalensee (1976). An example of loyal market share function satisfying these
conditions is S (αi, α−i) = αiΣjαj .
14However, for instance, doubling the advertising expenditure leads to an increase in the size of the loyal market,
although the sharing rule does not change. Hence, escaladating advertising would increase the captured base of
each firm, all else equal.
15Post advertising, some consumers face infinite costs of switching from their favorite brand to another, while
the others have no switching costs. Persuasive advertising induces a psychological switching cost.
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The timing of the game can be justified by the fact that I deal with non-price advertising.
Firms are building-up a brand identity through advertising expenditure. A change in the brand
advertising takes time, whereas firms can modify their prices almost continuously.
The concept of equilibrium used in the model is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The two
stage advertising-pricing game is solved backwards.
3 The Pricing Stage
In the first stage, firms simultaneously choose the advertising investments. In the second stage,
knowing the whole profile of advertising expenditure, firms choose prices. In this section I solve
the pricing game for an arbitrary weakly ordered profile of advertising expenditure. Let Ui be
the loyal base of consumers captured by firm i, and let I = 1 − U = 1 − ΣiUi be the group of
brand switchers who buy the lowest priced brand. Without loss of generality, assume Ui ≥ Uj
whenever i ≤ j with i, j ∈ N = {1, 2, ...n}.16
For any firm i ∈ N only the prices in the interval Ai = [c, r] are relevant, with c being the
common constant marginal cost of production. Pricing at pi < c firms would make negative
profits and pricing at pi > r firms would make zero profits.
The profit function of firm i, i = 1, 2...n is given by:
πi (pi, p−i) =



(pi − c) (Ui + I) if pi ≤ r and pi < pj , ∀j 6= i;
(pi − c) (Ui + Iϕ) if pi ≤ r , pi = pj , j ∈M ⊆ N
and pi < pk,∀k ∈ NÂM with ϕ = 1|M | ;
(pi − c)Ui if pi ≤ r and ∃j 6= i s.t. pj < pi.
(1)
The firms choose the prices that maximize their payoﬀs taking as given the pricing strategies of
the rivals.
At this stage, firms count with a loyal group and at the same time they compete for the
remaining brand indiﬀerent consumers. However, if all firms price above marginal costs, there
are incentives to undercut in order to win the switchers market. Pricing at marginal cost cannot
form part of an equilibrium as firms can always obtain monopoly profits on their loyal base. The
tension between the incentives to undercut in order to win the indiﬀerent market and those to
extract surplus from the loyals lead to the following result.
16Loyal consumers buy their favourite brand whenever its price does not exceed their reservation value. To
characterize the oﬀ the equilibrium path, assume that, in case their favourite is priced above the reservation value,
loyals purchase a random product whenever is priced below reservation value.
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Proposition 1 The game (Ai, πi; i ∈ N) has no pure strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium.
Existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium can be proven by construction.17 This approach
gives also the functional forms of the equilibrium pricing strategies of the firms.
A mixed strategy for firm i is defined by a function, fi : Ai → [0, 1] , which assigns a
probability density fi (p) ≥ 0 to each pure strategy p ∈ Ai so that
R
Ai fi (p) dp = 1.
Let bSi = [Li,Hi] be the support of the equilibrium price distribution of firm i. This means
that fi (p) > 0 for all p ∈ bSi. Denominate by Fi (p) the cumulative distribution function related
to fi (p) .
At a price p, a firm sells to its loyal market and is the winner of the indiﬀerent market
provided that p is the lowest price. Consequently, its expected demand is given by:
Di (p) = (1− ΣiUi)Πj 6=i (1− Fj (p)) + Ui.
The following lemmas present a number of features of the price distributions. The lowest
bound of the price supports has to be shared by at least two firms. If only one firm puts
positive density on the minimal lower bound, this firm has incentives to move the density to the
second lowest bound. In-between the two prices the firm faces no competition and its profits
are increasing. When selling to its maximal market (loyal group plus the switchers) at a specific
(low) price a firm makes profits equal to monopoly profits on its loyal base. A firm does not
put positive density at prices below this specific level. At any price in its support a firms
faces a positive probability of loosing the switchers. Hence all firms put positive density on the
monopoly price. If all firms have an atom at the upper bound, there is a positive probability of a
tie and, therefore, incentives to undercut. An analogous reasoning indicates that the distribution
function should be continuos below the upper bound.
Lemma 1 Let L = Lk = mini {Li} . Then ∃ j 6= k, such that Lj = Lk = L. Moreover for each
firm
Li − c ≥ (r − c)
Ui
Ui + I
.
Proof. If Lk = mini {Li} and @ j, s.t. Lj = Lk, choosing a lower bound in the interval
(Lk, L0) , with L0 = mini6=k {Li} , does not decrease firm k’s probability of being the winner of
17 It is guaranteed as the pricing game satisfies the conditions found by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, p. 14,
Thm.5). The emergence of mixed-strategy equilibria when there is a mass of consumers with zero switching costs
and there are consumers with positive switching costs was also pointed out by Klemperer (1987).
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the indiﬀerent consumers, and strictly increases its expected profits. Then, ∃ j 6= k, such that
Lj = Lk. Suppose firm i chooses a price p such that p − c < (r − c) UiUi+I . Then, the maximal
profits of firm i when pricing at p are (p− c) (I + Ui) < (r − c)Ui. The RHS represents the
certain profit of firm i when it sells only to its loyal base at the monopoly price (its minmax
value). Then, Li − c ≥ (r − c) UiUi+I for all i.
Lemma 2 Hi = r, ∀ i = 1, ..., n.
Proof. At any price pi > r, πi (pi, p−i) = 0. This implies Hi ≤ r. Let Hm = minj∈N {Hj}.
Suppose by contradiction that Hm < r.
I show first that (a) @j ∈ N such that fj (p) > 0 for p ∈ (Hm, r) . Suppose such j existed. Notice
that (1− Fm (p)) = 0 for p ∈ (Hm, r). Then, πj (p) = (p− c)Uj < (r − c)Uj , and firm j would
deviate.
To complete the proof I show that (b) A = {i | i ∈ N and Hi = Hm} = ∅.
That is, Hm < r ⇔ A 6= ∅. By (a), Hj = r for j ∈ N \A. (b1) Let |A| = 1 ⇔ A = {m} . Then,
because Πj 6=m (1− Fj (Hm)) = Πj 6=m (1− Fj (r − ε)) , follows that
(Hm − c) (Um + IΠj 6=m (1− Fj (Hm))) < (r − c− ε) (Um + IΠj 6=m (1− Fj (r − ε))),
and firm m would deviate. (b2) Let |A| > 1. If ∃j ∈ A s.t. pr (pj = Hm) = 0, then the previous
argument applies to i ∈ A, i 6= j and there are incentives to deviate. If ∀j ∈ A, pr (pj = Hm) 6= 0,
there is positive probability of a tie at Hm and any firm j has incentives to deviate to Hm − ε
for ε > 0 small.
Lemma 3 There is at least one firm that does not have an atom at r.
Proof. Assume to the contrary that all firms assign positive probability to pricing at r,
equal to φi ∈ (0, 1]. Then by pricing at r, firm k makes profits of (r − c) (Uk + Iφ) , where φ =
1
nΠi6=kφi. But, pricing at r − ε, firm k makes profits of (r − c− ε) (Uk + I) > (r − c) (Uk + Iφ)
for 0 < ε < I(1−φ)I+Uk (r − c) . This proves that ∃k ∈ N, s.t. Fk (r) = 1.
Lemma 4 Fi (p) is continuous on [Li, r).
Proof. A heuristic proof follows, and a formal one is presented in the Appendix. If firm i
has a jump at p ∈ [Li, r), then there is ε > 0 such that for j 6= i, Fj (p) = Fj (p+ ε) . Otherwise,
firm j would increase its expected profit by choosing p − δ, instead of pj ∈ (p, p+ ε). This
contradicts the optimality of p given that firm i would only increase its profits by moving the
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mass to p+ ε. Notice that this argument fails at p = r because profits at r+ ε are equal to zero.
Remark 1 Lemmas 1-4 do not rule out the existence of degenerate distributions for some firms.
I propose the following asymmetric pricing equilibrium, valid for any weakly ordered profile
of loyal bases.
Conjecture 1 For U1 ≥ ... ≥ Un−1 ≥ Un, the supports are bSn = [L, r] , bSn−1 = [L, r] andbSk = {r} for k = 1, 2...n − 2. In addition, Fk (p) = 0 for p < r and Fk (p) = 1 for p ≥ r. The
cdf’s Fn (p) and Fn−1 (p) are continuous on [Li, r) and Fn−1 (r) < 1.
Note that by Lemma 3, Li − c ≥ (r − c) UiI+Ui for all i. Also Lk − c ≥ (r − c)
Un−1
I+Un−1 for any
k ≤ n− 2. Then firm n has no incentives to put positive densities to prices p ∈ [(r − c) UnI+Un +
c, (r − c) Un−1I+Un−1 + c) because all these prices are strictly dominated by p = (r − c)
Un−1
I+Un−1 + c,
which does not decrease the probability of winning the indiﬀerent consumers (I), but strictly
increases firm’s expected profits. Therefore, L = (r − c) Un−1I+Un−1 + c.
At equilibrium a firm should be indiﬀerent among all the strategies (prices) that form the
support of its distribution function. Firm n should be indiﬀerent between any price p ∈ [L, r)
and pricing at the lower bound of its support, L. It follows that:
(p− c) [(1− Fn−1 (p)) I + Un] = (L− c) (I + Un)⇒
Fn−1 (p) =
(p− L) (Un + I)
I (p− c) .
Similarly, firm n− 1 should be indiﬀerent between any price p ∈ [L, r) and pricing at the upper
bound of its support, r. This gives:
(p− c) [(1− Fn (p)) I + Un−1] = (r − c)Un−1 ⇒
Fn (p) =
(p− c) (Un−1 + I)− (r − c)Un−1
I (p− c) .
For the conjectured strategies to be an equilibrium: i) expected profit of any firm should be
constant at all prices in the support of its distribution, ii) distribution functions should be well
defined and, iii) no firm should have incentives to price outside its support.
i) Constant profit conditions.
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The expected profits are:
πk (r) = (r − c)Uk ∀k ∈ NÂ {n− 1, n} ,
Eπn−1 (p) = (r − c)Un−1 ∀p ∈ bSn−1,
Eπn (p) = (L− c) (Un + I) ∀p ∈ bSn.
Consider pricing in the interval [L, r). Only firms n and n − 1 choose these prices. Using the
distribution functions it can be easily shown that this requirement is fulfilled.
ii) Properties of the distribution functions.
The distribution functions are increasing
¡
F 0n−1 (p) > 0, F 0n (p) > 0
¢
with Fn−1 (L) = Fn (L) = 0.
Firm n− 1 puts positive probability on pricing at r equal to Un−1−UnUn−1+I , while the cdf of firm n is
continuous on [Ln−1, r]. For any firm k = 1, 2...n− 2, the degenerate distribution functions are
well defined.
iii) Deviation outside the support.
For firms n and n− 1, deviating outside the support means pricing above r or pricing below L.
But, all such prices are strictly dominated by pricing in the interval [L, r] .
Consider firm k = 1, 2...n− 2. Deviating to price p < r, it makes profits:
(p− c) (Uk + I (1− Fn (p)) (1− Fn−1 (p))) =
(p− c)Uk + (r − p)Uk
[(L− c) I − (p− L)Un]Un−1
I (p− c)Uk
.
Its expected profit at r is (r − c)Uk = (r − p)Uk + (p− c)Uk. Let g (p) = [(L−c)I−(p−L)Un]Un−1I(p−c)Uk
and notice that g0 (p) = − (L−c)Un−1(I+Un)p−c < 0 and g (L) =
Un−1
Uk ≤ 1. It follows that deviation to
prices in the interval [L, r) is not profitable. Deviation to prices below L is trivially unprofitable.
Hence, no firm has incentives to price outside its support. This completes the proof of next result.
Proposition 2 The following distribution functions represent a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
of the pricing subgame (Ai, πi; i ∈ N).
Fn (p) =



0 for p < L = (r − c) Un−1I + Un−1
+ c
(I + Un−1)
I −
(r − c)Un−1
I (p− c) for L ≤ p ≤ r
1 for p ≥ r
,
Fn−1 (p) =



0 for p < L = (r − c) Un−1I + Un−1
+ c
(I + Un)
I −
(r − c)Un−1 (I + Un)
I (p− c) (I + Un−1)
for L ≤ p ≤ r
1 for p ≥ r
,
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Fk (p) =



0 for p < r
1 for p ≥ r
for ∀k = 1, 2...n− 2.
r
1
0
F
p)
[
)
L
Un+I/ 
Un-1+I
Fn(p) Fn-1(p) Fk(p), 
k=1,...n-2
Figure 1: Price distributions in Proposition 2
The price of firm k (k = 1, 2...n− 2) first order stochastically dominates the price of firm
n− 1, while the latter stochastically dominates the price of firm n.
When charging a price p < r, a firm i with Ui > Uj , i, j ∈ N, looses ∆− = (r − p)Ui >
(r − p)Uj , while facing the same potential gain as firm j in the indiﬀerent market∆+ = (p− c) I.
Thus, firm i is less aggressive than firm j because it tends to loose more. Given that with n ≥ 3
the price rivalry augments, it turns out that the firms with higher loyal base Uk ≥ Un−1,
k = 1, ...n− 2, choose to maintain monopoly pricing, r, with probability 1. The mass point at r
in the distribution of firm n− 1 increases in the diﬀerence between the two lowest loyal bases,
Fn−1 (r) = 1− Un−1−UnUn−1+I .
The firms that choose degenerate distributions make deterministic profits πk (r) = (r − c)Uk
for k = 1, ...n−2. The expected profits of the remaining firms are Eπn−1 (p) = (r − c)Un−1 and
Eπn (p) = (L− c) (Un + I) = (r − c)Un−1 Un+IUn−1+I .
Notice that (r − c)Un−1 ≥ Eπn (p) ≥ (r − c)Un. Then, Eπi (p) ≥ Eπj (p) whenever Ui ≥ Uj
(or i ≤ j). Firm n−1, despite of choosing a mixed pricing strategy, makes in equilibrium expected
profit equal to the profit it would make on its loyal base if it chose monopoly pricing. By contrast,
at equilibrium, firm n has expected profit higher than its monopoly profit on its loyal base.
The equilibrium in Proposition 2 predicts price dispersion in relatively small markets. When
the number of firms increases, so does the number of firms that permanently choose monopoly
pricing, and the dispersion in prices tends to become insignificant. The higher the number of
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competitors the lower the chances of an individual firm to win the indiﬀerent market. When the
number of competitors is higher more firms prefer to rely on their locked-in markets and act as
monopolists rather than engage in aggressive pricing.
Narasimhan (1988) oﬀers an explanation for price dispersion in competitive markets based
on consumer loyalty. He restricts attention to a duopoly. The present paper oﬀers an extension
of his setting to oligopoly. With arbitrary weakly ordered profiles of loyal groups, only the two
lowest firms engage in price promotions18 and, for this reason, the potential of this model to
explain market wide price promotions is limited when the number of firms increases.
The next Proposition presents a uniqueness result.
Proposition 3 If firms employ convex supports, the equilibrium stated in Proposition 2 is the
unique equilibrium that applies to any weakly ordered profile of loyal bases.
However, when n > 2, for particular profiles of loyal groups, there are other pricing equilibria,
as well. In all equilibria the firms make the same expected payoﬀs. This allows to solve the
reduced form game in the first stage. I present another equilibrium for the profile Un < Un−1 =
... = U1, which turns out to be relevant for the present analysis.
Proposition 4 If the loyal bases, Ui, i = 1, 2...n, satisfy Ui = U for i = 1, 2...n−1 and Un < U ,
there exists a pricing equilibrium with all firms randomizing over the same convex support. The
firms choose prices according to the following distributions:
Fi (p) =



0 for p < L = (r − c) U
I + U
+ c
1−
·
(L− c) (I + Un)
I (p− c) −
Un
I
¸ 1
n−1
for L ≤ p < r
1 for p ≥ r
for i = 1, 2...n− 1,
Fn (p) =



0 for p < L = (r − c) U
I + U
+ c
1−
·
(r − p)U
I (p− c)
¸ ·
L (I + Un)
I (p− c) −
Un
I
¸2−n
n−1
for L ≤ p ≤ r
1 for p ≥ r
.
Proof. Directly follows from the constant profit condition.
18Pricing below the monopoly level with positive probability is interpreted as a price promotion.
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L
Fn(p) Fi(p) i=1,...n-1
1-(U-Un/I+U)1/n-1
Figure 2: Price distributions in Proposition 4
Remark 2 For this specific profile of loyal bases, there are other equilibria in-between the ones
in Propositions 2 and 4. They have a number k < n−2 of firms choosing r with probability 1 and
the rest randomizing over the same convex support. Firms n− 1 and n necessarily randomize.
It can be seen from Proposition 4 and Figure 2 that price of firm n is stochastically dominated
by price of firm i (i = 1, ..., n − 1). The same intuition as before holds, but given that Ui = U
for i = 1, 2...n− 1 it is possible that all firms randomize at equilibrium.
The pricing subgame maybe understood as a variant of Varian’s “Model of Sales”, with
asymmetric captured consumer bases. “A Model of Sales” is meant to describe markets which
exhibit price dispersion, despite the existence of at least some rational consumers.19 The model
interprets sales as a way to discriminate between consumers who are assumed to come in two
types, informed and uninformed. All consumers have a common reservation value and they
purchase a unit of the good whenever the price does not exceed the valuation, the uninformed
ones choose randomly a shop and the informed ones buy from the cheapest seller. Varian restricts
attention to the symmetric equilibrium of the symmetric game (with uninformed consumers
evenly split amongst the firms).20 However, there exists a family of asymmetric equilibria of the
symmetric game.21
19Varian is concerned with understanding “temporal price dispersion” rather than “spatial price dispersion”.
That is, intertemporal changes in the pricing of a given firm rather than cross-sectional price volatility.
20 If the optimal pricing distributions are continuous and the supports are convex, then the equilibrium is
symmetric (Proposition 9 of Varian (1980), p.658). See the Appendix for a transcription of this Proposition.
21A comprehensive analysis of all the asymmetric equilibria of the symmetric game is provided by Baye,
Kovenock and deVries (1992).
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The present setting oﬀers a way of endogenizing the creation of locked-in consumers, and it
raises a robustness question to Varian’s symmetric setting because it turns out that at equilib-
rium the captured bases are asymmetric.
Extending Varian’s model, Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1992) construct a metagame in
which consumers are also players. In the first stage, uninformed consumers and firms move
simultaneously. Firms choose a price distribution and the uninformed consumers decide from
which firms to purchase. In the second stage, the informed consumers choose the seller they will
buy from. Given that the asymmetric price distributions can be ranked by first-order stochastic
dominance, they show that the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the extensive game is the
symmetric one. However, this follows from the equilibrium consistency requirement that a firm
with higher expected price cannot have a larger uninformed consumer base.
4 Advertising Expenditure Choices
In this section, I derive the equilibrium of the reduced form game in the first stage where
oligopolists simultaneously choose an advertising expenditure. Their payoﬀs are the profits
emerging in the pricing stage minus the chosen advertising expenditure. The gross of advertising
cost profits are:
Eπj (p) = (r − c)Uj , ∀p ∈ bSj and ∀j ∈ N \ {n} ;
Eπn (p) = (L− c) (Un + I) = (r − c)Un−1
(Un + I)
(Un−1 + I)
, ∀p ∈ bSn.
The loyal consumer group of firm i (Ui) is defined as a share S (αi, α−i) of the total number of
loyal consumers given by U (Σiαi) . That is,
Ui (αi, α−i) = S (αi, α−i)U (Σjαj) .
Each firm may invest in generating loyal consumers and the total number of brand loyals on the
market is determined by the aggregate expenditure. The advertising technology is imperfect,
so that there is always a fraction of the consumers who are not persuaded (or reached) by
advertising.22 This fraction forms the brand indiﬀerent group (I) and buys the cheapest product,
I = 1− ΣiUi (αi, α−i) = 1− U (Σiαi) .
22Alternatively, one can think that these consumers enter the market after advertising took place.
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Under the assumptions made so far, the loyal group of a firm is increasing in own advertising. The
incremental consumers may proceed from the brand indiﬀerent group (U 0 (Σiαi) > 0) or from
the rival loyal groups
³
∂S(αi,α−i)
∂αi ≥ 0
´
. The last source leaves open the possibility of reciprocal
cancellation across brands.23 An increase in rival advertising has two conflictive eﬀects on the
loyal base of a firm. There is a positive eﬀect due to the increase in the total number of loyals
(U 0 (Σiαi) > 0) and a negative one due to a decrease in the share of the firm
³
∂S(αi,α−i)
∂αj ≤ 0
´
.
I assume that the overall eﬀect of rival advertising is negative.24
Assumption 1:
∂2Ui
∂αi∂αj
< 0; ∂
2
∂αn∂αj
µ
Un−1 (Un + I)
(Un−1 + I)
¶
< 0 and ∂∂αi
Ui (0, α−i) >
1
r − c.
The first and second conditions are suﬃcient for an equilibrium to exist.25 The last condition is
necessary for a non-trivial result. In the remainder of this paper, the first subscript refers to the
identity of the firm, and the second to the partial derivative. That is, Si,j = ∂Si∂αj =
∂S(αi,α−i)
∂αj
and Uj,j = ∂Uj∂αj =
∂(Sj(αj ,α−j)U(Σiαi))
∂αj .
Firms j = 1, 2...n− 1 maximize the expected profit net of advertising expenditure:
πnetj = (r − c)SjU (Σiαi)− αj .
Firm n maximizes its expected profit net of advertising costs:
πnetn = (r − c)Sn−1U (Σiαi)
(SnU (Σiαi) + I)
(Sn−1U (Σiαi) + I)
− αn.
The FOC of the maximization problems above implicitly define α∗n (α−n) and α∗j (α−j) for j =
1, 2...n− 1. In addition, α∗l = α∗j = α∗,∀j, l ∈ N \ {n} .
A symmetric equilibrium
³
α∗n = α∗j = α∗
´
exists if, when choosing α∗, firm n does not have
incentives to decrease, and the other firms do not have incentives to increase.
∂
∂αn
πnetn (α∗) ≥ 0 and
∂
∂αj
πnetj (α∗) ≤ 0 for all j = 1, 2, ...n− 1.
In Appendix B it is shown that this requirement leads to a contradiction. Together with the
optimization problem above, this proves the following result.
23Metwally (1975,1976) and Lambin (1976) find empirical evidence in this sense.
24The market size is normalized to 1. It is possible that advertising raises all firms’ market shares, but seems
more reasonable to be so if it generates a market size expansion.
25Concavity of the profit functions guarantees well defined best responses, while strategic substitutability of
advertising investments guarantees that at the asymmetric equilibrium candidate firms do not leapfrog each other.
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Proposition 5 Under Assumption 1, in any pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the reduced
form advertising game, αn < αi = αj for ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2...n− 1} . The values of αn and αi
(∀i ∈ {1, 2...n− 1}) are implicitly defined by the FOCs.
Proposition 6 The advertising expenditure in Proposition 5, together with any of the pricing
strategy profiles in Proposition 2, Proposition 4, or Remark 2 represent the subgame perfect
equilibria of the two stage game.
The asymmetric equilibrium may seem counterintuitive and arbitrary, however it follows from
the fact that firms weight their first and second stage decisions. A larger first stage investment
triggers less aggressive second stage pricing, while a lower investment imposes a more aggressive
pricing strategy.
To illustrate Proposition 5, let S (αi, α−i) = αiΣjαj for ∀i ∈ N, U (Σiαi) =
Σiαi
1+Σiαi , and c = 0.
Table 1 presents the equilibrium advertising expenditure, the size of the indiﬀerent group, and
the net profits of the firms, for diﬀerent values of of n and r.26
The sharing rule in the example, S (αi, α−i) = αiΣjαj maybe interpreted as a probability that
an arbitrary loyal consumer chooses firm i.27
Although they are identical, at equilibrium, firms choose asymmetric advertising expenditure.
This asymmetry follows from the choice of mixed pricing strategies. There is one firm with a
strictly lower advertising level (firm n in the example) and with the lowest loyal group. All
other firms choose the same higher level of advertising and have equal larger loyal consumer
bases. It is diﬃcult to rank the net profits of the firms; however, in the examples above, the low
advertiser makes lower profits than its rivals. This need not be always the case: The levels of
net profits depend on the number of firms, on the advertising technology, and on the monopoly
margins.
The lowest loyal group firm prices more aggressively, has higher probability of being the
winner of the indiﬀerent market, and makes lower gross expected profits. All other firms price
less aggressive and make equal gross of advertising expenditure profits equal to monopoly profit
on their loyal market.
26For computational convenience, the chosen advertising technology is a very eﬀective one, resulting in a large
loyal market (U) .
27This probability is nonincreasing in i and thus a firm with higher advertising is more likely to be chosen by
a loyal consumer.
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Table 1:
n r − c αj , j 6= n αn Uj , j 6= n Un I πnetj , j 6= n πnetn
5 100 16.56 11.79 .209 .149 .012 4.39 3.46
5 25 4.48 .21 .234 .011 .052 1.37 1.08
4 100 19.22 15.37 .259 .207 .013 6.74 5.64
4 25 5.09 1.58 .285 .088 .055 2.03 1.43
3 100 22.53 19.62 .343 .298 .015 11.76 10.43
3 25 5.82 3.11 .369 .197 .063 3.41 2.45
5 A Random Utility Interpretation
In this section I oﬀer a possible microfoundation to the demand system considered in the case
of a duopoly. In particular, I argue that a random utility model can lead to the proportional
market sharing function Si = αiΣjαj used in the examples, when consumers respond to advertising
and prices, but are short-sighted. With a duopoly there is a unique mixed pricing equilibrium
where both firms randomize, and E (pi | pi < r) = E (pj | pj < r) . In the marketing literature,
price dispersion models are used to explain price promotions. The expected price conditional
on a brand being being priced lower than r is thought of as the average discounted price, while
1−F (r) measures the frequency of discounts. Considering that loyal consumers are myopic and
care only about the average discount and advertising, the proportional market sharing function,
Si = αiΣjαj , can be derived from a random utility model.
28
6 Discussion
While there is no doubt that advertising plays an important informative role in the economy, not
less numerous are the occasions in which it does not provide any relevant information on price
or product characteristics. In many homogenous product markets, advertising only operates
a redistribution of the consumers among the sellers. Many advertising campaigns and a great
deal of the TV spot advertising have rather an emotional content and try to attract consumers
associating the product with attitudes or feelings that have no relevant relation to the product
28Consumers have idiosyncratic preferences over the brands and each consumer chooses the one that has the
greatest brand advertising-average discount diﬀerential (see Anderson, De Palma and Thisse (1992)).
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or its consumption.29
Loewenstein (2001) remarks “[w]hile conventional models of decision making can make sense
of advertisements that provide information about products (whether informative or misleading),
much advertising- for example, depicting happy, attractive friends drinking Coca-Cola seem to
have little informational content. Instead such advertising seems to be intended to create mental
associations that operate in both directions, causing one to think that one should be drinking
Coca-Cola if one is with friends (by evoking a choice heuristic) and to infer one that one must
be having fun if one is drinking Coca-Cola (playing on the diﬃculty of evaluating one’s hedonic
state).”30 He points out to the importance of situational construals, people “often seem to behave
according to a two-stage process in which they first attempt to figure out what kind of situation
they are in and then adopt choice rules that seem appropriate for that situation”. Persuasive
advertising could be a way to influence such categorization through mental associations. As
an example of association, Pepsi’s 1997 GeneratioNext campaign defines itself as being “about
everything that is young and fresh, a celebration of the creative spirit. It is about the kind of
attitude that challenges the norm with new ideas, at every step of the way”.31 Similarly, Perrier
significantly strengthened its position in the French mineral water market with its advertising
campaign directed to the younger generation, under the slogan “Perrier c’est fou” (“Perrier is
crazy”) making the product be perceived as very fashioned.32 These considerations support the
persuasive view on advertising and oﬀer a justification for the stylized setting here.
29Explaining the content of Chevrolet TV ads for automobiles “Heartbeat of America”, broadcasted in 1988,
General Motors advertising executive Sean Fitzpatrick observed that they “may look disorganized, but every
detail is cold-heartedly calculated. People see the scenes they want to identify with.[...] It’s not verbal. It’s
not rational. It’s emotional, just the way people buy cars.” (see Scherer and Ross 1990 p.573, originally from
“On the Road again, with a Passion”, New York Times October 10th, 1988) Also, commenting on the new
trends in television advertising, James Twitchell Professor of advertising at the University of Florida noted that
“Advertising is becoming art. You don’t need it, but it’s fun to look at” (see Herald Tribune, January 10th, 2003
p.7).
30 In the same spirit Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec (forthcoming) notice "Prevailing models of advertising
assume that ads convey information or signal a product’s quality or, for "network" or "status" goods, a product’s
likely popularity. Many of these models seem like strained attempts to explain eﬀects of advertising without
incorporating the obvious intuition that advertising taps the neural circuitry of reward and desire".
31See www.pepsi.com. Coke relies on more traditional values in its “Coca Cola...Real” campaign. See also
Tremblay and Polasky (2002).
32See J. Sutton (1991), p.253. Even more relevant for the present discussion is the subsequent campaign of
Perrier under the (only literary) meaningless slogan “Ferrier c’est pou”, a partial toggle of its initial slogan.
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The present analysis suggests that high advertisers tend to have higher prices. Often, blind
tests show that consumers perceive highly advertised brands as diﬀerent.33 The model also
predicts the existence of a group of heavy advertisers and of a low advertiser. This is compliant
with the empirical evidence that markets with significant advertising have a two-tier structure.
The endogenous asymmetric advertising profile is more suitable for small oligopolies. In the
US sport drinks market, Coca Cola and Pepsico are the two major suppliers. In 2002, Pepsico
invested 125 millions to promote its product Gatorade, while Coca Cola invested 11 millions to
advertise its product Powerade.
Several extensions to this work are worth mentioning. A major limitation of the present
model is the extreme post-advertising heterogeneity of consumers: Loyal consumers are ex-
tremely advertising responsive, while the indiﬀerent ones continue to be extremely price sensi-
tive. One may consider a smoother distribution of advertising-induced switching costs. Also,
here, indiﬀerent consumers are aware about existence of all products. Possibly it is more realistic
to assume that the indiﬀerent consumers know only the prices of some sellers.
7 Conclusions
The present article proposes a way to model the eﬀects of persuasive advertising on price compe-
tition in a homogenous product market. I solve a two stage game in which an oligopoly competes,
first, in persuasive advertising and, then, in prices. Advertising results in the creation of a loyal
group attached to the firm. The equilibrium outcome exhibits price dispersion, although it is
possible to have in equilibrium up to n − 2 firms choosing monopoly pricing with probability
1. The endogenous advertising choices of the firms reflect the asymmetry in the mixed pricing
strategies and, at equilibrium, there is one firm that chooses a lower level of advertising and
the remaining ones choose the same higher advertising. In expected terms, the low advertiser
prices more aggressively, while the intensive advertisers choose higher prices. Firms balance
their first and second stage choices and, as a result, the market outcome is asymmetric despite
initial symmetry of firms. The setting shows how persuasive advertising may create a two-tier
market and be successfully used to relax price competition.
33“Double-blind experiments have repeatedly demonstrated that consumers cannot consistently distinguish
premium from popular-priced beer brands, but exhibit definite preferences for the premium brands when labels
are aﬃxed-correctly or not.” (see Scherer and Ross 1990 p.582)
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8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium profile. Then,
by the definition of such equilibrium, @pi such that πi
¡
pi, p∗−i
¢
> πi
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
. Let i be such that
p∗i ≤ p∗k,∀k 6= i. Consider first the case where p∗i = p∗j 6= c, where p∗j = {min p∗k | k ∈ N \ {i}} .
Then πi
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
= (p∗i − c) (Ui + Iϕ) < πi
¡
p∗i − ε, p∗−i
¢
= (p∗i − c− ε) (Ui + I) . Hence, ∃pi =
p∗i −ε, for 0 < ε <
(p∗i−c)(1−ϕ)I
Ui+I , such that πi
¡
pi, p∗−i
¢
> πi
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
. This argument fails at p∗i =
p∗j = c, but πi
¡
c, p∗−i
¢
= 0 < πi
¡
r, p∗−i
¢
. Consider, finally, the case p∗i < p∗j , where p∗j ={min p∗k |
k ∈ N \ {i}}. Then πi
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
= (p∗i − c) (Ui + I) < πi
¡
p∗i + ε, p∗−i
¢
= (p∗i − c+ ε) (Ui + I)
whenever ε < p∗j−p∗i . Then, ∃pi = p∗i+ε, for 0 < ε < p∗j−p∗i , such that πi
¡
pi, p∗−i
¢
> πi
¡
p∗i , p∗−i
¢
.
The cases presented above complete the proof of nonexistence of a pure strategy Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium in the game (Ai, πi; i ∈ N) .
Proof of Lemma 4. I prove that Fi (p) is continuous on [Li, r) by contradiction. Assume
there is a mass point in the equilibrium distribution of firm i at price p < r and let the mass be
equal to ξ. For simplicity, let c = 0.
Case 1. Suppose ∃ j pricing in the interval (p, p+ ε]. Then, the variation in the profit of firm j
when pricing at p− ε instead of p+ ε is:
(p− ε) [Uj + IΠk 6=j (1− Fk (p− ε))]− (p+ ε) [Uj + IΠk 6=j (1− Fk (p+ ε))] ≥
−2εUj +Πk 6=i,j (1− Fk (p− ε))

 I (p− ε) (1− Fi (p− ε))
−I (p+ ε) (1− Fi (p+ ε))

 =
− 2εUj +Πk 6=i,j (1− Fk (p− ε))

 I (p+ ε) (Fi (p+ ε)− Fi (p− ε))
−2εI (1− Fi (p− ε))

 .
Then, Eπj (p− ε)−Eπj (p+ ε)→ Πk 6=i,j (1− Fk (p)) Ipξ > 0 when ε→ 0. This contradicts the
optimality of the equilibrium strategy of firm j.
Case 2. Suppose @j pricing in the interval (p, p+ ε] , then
Eπi (p+ ε) = (p+ ε)Ui + I (p+ ε)Πk 6=i (1− Fk (p)) > pUi + IpΠk 6=i (1− Fk (p)).
This contradicts the optimality of the equilibrium strategy of firm i and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose there exists a Nash equilibrium in prices diﬀerent than
the one in Proposition 2. Let bS∗i be the associated supports of the price distributions. For
simplicity, let c = 0.
By Lemma 2, {r} ⊆ bS∗i for all i. Let K = ni | {r} 6= bS∗i o .
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By Proposition 1 and Lemma 1, |K| ≥ 2.
a) Assume, first, |K| > 2.
By Lemma 3, ∃l ∈ N, such that f∗l (r) = 0. Notice that for all i ∈ NÂK, f∗i (r) = 1. Hence,
l ∈ K.
By Lemma 1, ∃i, k ∈ N , s.t. Li = min bS∗i = Lk = min bS∗k
a1) Suppose that l = i. Let k, h ∈ K, k 6= l 6= h and Ll = Lk.
1.1. Consider, first, the case Lh > Ll = Lk. Then,
p (Uh + IΠj 6=h (1− Fj (p))) = rUh and p (Uk + IΠj 6=k (1− Fj (p))) = rUk.
It follows that 1−Fk(p)1−Fh(p) =
Uh
Uk or Fk (p) =
Uk−Uh
Uk +
Uh
UkFh (p) .
By Lemma 4, Fh (Lh) = 0⇒ Fk (Lh) = Uk−UhUk . Then, because Lh > Lk Fk (Lh) > 0⇔ Uk > Uh.
If firm h deviates to Lk, then for sure wins and makes profits of Lk (Uh + I) . But, Lk ≥ UkrUk+I >
Uhr
Uh+I ⇒ Lk (Uh + I) >
Uhr
Uh+I (Uh + I) = Uhr, where the RHS of the equality is the profit of firm
h when it prices on its support. This proves that this cannot be an equilibrium.
1.2. Consider that Lh = Ll = Lk. Following the equilibrium conditions above Fh (Lh) = 0 ⇒
Fk (Lh) = Uk−UhUk ⇒ Uk = Uh. This proves that this cannot be an equilibrium for any profile of
weakly ordered loyal bases.
a2) Suppose that i 6= l 6= k. Then, Ll > Li = Lk. Then, using the above equilibrium condition,
follows that Uk = Ui. So this cannot be an equilibrium for any profile of weakly ordered loyal
bases.
b) Finally, by construction, the equilibrium presented in Proposition 2 is unique for |K| = 2.
Proposition (Varian (1980), p.658): If each store’s optimal strategy involves zero prob-
ability of a tie, and f (p) > 0 for all p∗ ≤ p < r, then each store must choose the same strategy.
Notation: f (p) represents the pricing density, p∗ represents the average cost associated with
serving the whole informed market plus the proportional part of the uninformed one and r is
the common reservation value of the consumers.
8.2 Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 5. The advertising choices, in the reduced form game, follow from the
FOC’s of the maximization problems (see Proposition 5):
∂πneti
∂αi = 0⇔ Ui,i =
1
(r−c)
∂πnetn
∂αn = 0⇔
(Un+I)(Un−1+I)Un−1,n+Un−1
h³
Un,n−U
0´
(Un−1+I)−
³
Un−1,n−U
0´
(Un+I)
i
(Un−1+I)2
= 1(r−c)
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Suppose to the contrary that α∗n = α∗j = α∗ for all j 6= n. Then, should hold that:
∂
∂αnπ
net
n (α∗) ≥ 0 and ∂∂αj π
net
j (α∗) ≤ 0 for all j = 1, 2, ...n− 1.
The above inequalities imply the following one:
Ui,i ≤ Un−1,n(Un+I)Un−1+I +
Un−1[(Un,n−U 0)(Un−1+I)−(Un−1,n−U 0)(Un+I)]
[Un−1+I]2
Notice that Si (α∗) = Sj (α∗) and Si,i (α∗) = Sj,j (α∗) for ∀i, j. In eﬀect, Ui (α∗) = Uj (α∗) and
Ui,i (α∗) = Uj,j (α∗) for α∗n = α∗j = α∗, given that Ui = SiU and Ui,i = Si,iU + SiU 0. Then, the
last inequality becomes: Ui,i ≤ Un−1,n + Un−1[Un,n−Un−1,n](Un−1+I) ⇔
Si,iU + SiU 0 ≤ Sn−1,nU + Sn−1U 0 + Sn−1U Sn,nU+SnU
0−Sn−1,nU−Sn−1U 0
Sn−1U+1−U ⇔
Si,iU ≤ Sn−1,nU + Sn−1U Sn,nU−Sn−1,nUSn−1U+1−U ⇔
(Si,i − Sn−1,n)U (1− U) ≤ 0⇔
As Si,i > 0 and Si,j < 0 then the inequality holds only if U = 0 or U = 1. But,
limΣiαi→∞U (Σiαi) = 1 and
∂Ui(0,α−i)
∂αi > 0. Then, αn < αj = α,∀j 6= n.
Proof of Proposition 6. To make sure that the candidate maximum defines the first
stage strategies in a subgame perfect equilibrium, firm j = 1, ...n− 1 should not have incentives
to leapfrog firm n, and firm n should not have incentives to leapfrog its rivals.
Consider firm n. Its profits are:
πn (α) =



(r − c)Un−1 (α, α∗i )
Un(α,α∗i )+I
Un−1(α,α∗i )+I
− α if α ≤ α∗i
(r − c)Un (α,α∗i )− α if α > α∗i
,
where α is the choice of firm n and α∗i is the equilibrium choices of firms j = 1, ...n− 1.
Consider the case α > α∗i , then the following is true:
(r − c) ∂Un∂αn (α, α
∗
i )− 1 ≤ (r − c) ∂Un∂αn (α, α
∗
i , α∗n)− 1 = 0.
The LHS is the first derivative of the profit with respect to own choice and the RHS equal-
ity is the FOC of firm j in equilibrium. The inequality follows from strict concavity of Ui³
∂Uj
∂αj (α
∗
i , .) >
∂Uj
∂αj (α, .)
´
and from strategic substitutability of advertising choices³
∂Ui
∂αi (., α
∗
i ) > ∂Ui∂αi (., α
∗
n)
´
. Then, firm n has incentives to decrease.
When α ≤ α∗i , the profit function is strictly concave and, hence, maximized at α = α∗n.
Consider firm j = 1, ...n− 1. Its profits are:
πj (α) =



(r − c)Un (α, α∗i )− α if α ≥ α∗n
(r − c)Un (α, α∗i , α∗n)
Uj(α,α∗i ,α∗n)+I
Un(α,α∗i ,α∗n)+I
− α if α < α∗n
where α is the choice of firm n, and α∗i and α∗n are the equilibrium choice of firms j = 1, ...n− 1
and, respectively, n.
Consider α < α∗n, then the following is true:
∂πj(α)
∂αj (α, α
∗
i , α∗n) >
∂πn(α)
∂αn (α
∗
n, α∗i , α∗i ) = 0.
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The LHS is the first derivative of the profit with respect to own choice and the RHS equal-
ity is the FOC of firm n in equilibrium. The inequality follows from strict concavity of πj³
∂πi
∂αi (α
∗
n, .) < ∂πi∂αi (α, .)
´
and from the strategic substitutability of the advertising choices³
∂πj
∂αj (., α
∗
i ) <
∂πj
∂αj (., α
∗
n)
´
. Then, firm j has incentives to increase.
When α ≥ α∗n, the profit function is strictly concave and, hence, maximized at α = α∗j .
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